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WHO'S WATCHING THE WATCHMAN? 
THE REGULATION, OR NON-REGULA-
TION, OF AMERICA'S LARGEST LAW 
ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTION, 
THE PRIVATE POLICE* 
Gloria G. Oralia 
Deborah B. Honig 
Deborah Penny Port 
Shaunee H. Power 
Sara Ann Simmons 
Police have always been the object of an ambivalent public atti-
tude. From the founding of the first public police force in 1829 police 
have been regarded by some segments of society as an institution es-
sential for the preservation of public order and the protection of per-
sons and property. However, the development of police forces has 
been paralleled by consistent concern that the power they exercise 
infringes on the freedom of individuals. The resolution of these con-
flicting views of the police has never be adequately examined. Never-
theless, it is clear that the police have survived and grown as an institu-
tion in Anglo-American society, despite such conflicting views, in 
part because of the evolution of various mechanisms intended to limit, 
control and regulate the exercise of police power.1 The acceptance of 
the police institution has been paralleled by the development of de-
partmental discipline, legal controls, review boards and personnel 
incentives. 
In the past several decades private police have appeared on the 
law enforcement scene in unprecedented numbers. Although private 
* The authors wish to thank Professor Bernard L. Segal for his patience. en-
couragement and assistance, all of which were invaluable. 
1. Many police control mechanisms have been the subject of detailed criticism, 
and the effectiveness of such mechanisms has been strongly challenged. But, ·the fact 
that society has felt impelled to establish such a system supports the conclusion that 
police cannot be permitted to exist in a democratic society without a system of re-
strictions. 
433 
1
Dralla: Private Police
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1975
GOLDEN GATE LAW REVIEW 
police have long existed and, in fact, antedate public police forces, 
only recently has the private police industry in the United States 
rivaled the public police in size and scope. If present trends con-
tinue there may be twice as many private as public police within a 
decade.2 
The private police phenomenon is more than just a matter of the 
industry's growth. Of at least equal importance is the extent of these 
services and their consumers. Among the most recent and important 
consumers of private police services have been governmental agen-
cies. For example, private police supply the greater portion of anti-
hijacking security services at publicly-owned and operated airports. 
They are also used extensively to protect property and control crowds 
in government facilities. 
The powers of public and private police are not identical, but 
for many purposes the differences are not as important as might ini-
tially be thought. There are at least two reasons for this. First, a sub-
stantial number of private police exercise the same powers as pub-
lic police, except that the geographical area within which these 
powers may be exercised is limited for private police.3 Second, so-
called "security guards" comprise a large segment of the private police 
industry. Such guards, generally, utilize many of the same indicia of 
power that public police use, including uniforms, badges, and other 
insignia. Many carry weapons including guns, batons and chemical 
sprays, as well as handcuffs. The limits on the scope of their power to 
arrest and detain suspects is often murky. This is a result of the ab-
sence of legislation on the subject and because arrests by private po-
lice have not been subjected to judicial scrutiny to the same extent as 
have arrests by public police. 
Consequently, persons who have contact with private police are 
often faced by persons whose appearance, equipment and actions are 
virtually indistinguishable from those of public police. It is unlikely 
that either a citizen or private policeman can make a fair and frank 
evaluation of the limits of the private police officer's powers during 
such a confrontation. And, the courts have seldom dealt with these 
issues after-the-fact. 
2. J. KUKALlK & S. WILDHORN, PRIvATE POLlCE IN TIm UNITED STATES, 5 vols. 
(1972) (prepared by the Rand Corp. for the U.S. Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter 
cited as RAND]. For a critical examination of the Rand Study see M. LIPSON, ON 
GUARD: THE BUSINESS OF PRIVATE SECURITY (1975). 
3. Industrial police (e.g., iron and steel, railroad guards) and natural resources 
police (e.g., lumber, fish, animal protection guards) are among the clearest examples 
of private police whose powers often appear identical to those of public police. 
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Two basic questions arise from the existence of private police 
with their present authority: 
First, if the institution of a public police 
force is tolerated because the power it wields is 
circumscribed by the system of controls im-
posed, what controls should society impose upon 
private police? 
Second, would not consistent public policy 
require that police power in private hands, how-
ever limited, be subject to greater control and 
regulation than such power in the hands of pub-
lic agencies? 
Questions about the current state of private police regulation 
readily follow: Is there meaningful regulation of the private police 
industry? How effective is supervision where it exists? How much reg-
ulation should there be? It is the object of this study to provide some 
answers to these questions. 
Private police in the United States had not been subjected to sys-
tematic analysis prior to 1970. In that year, the Rand Corporation 
began a study of the private police industry for the U.S. Department 
of Justice, the results of which were published in 1972.4 The 
Rand study assembled data on the regulation of the private 
police by state and local governments. In addition, it made recom-
mendations relevant to future governmental policy in regulating pri-
vate police. But, it did not propose standards by which the adequacy 
of the regulation and control of the private police industry was to be 
measured. Because the functions of private police parallel those of 
their public counterparts, the nature of controls over public police 
must provide the "yardstick" by which the control and regulation of 
private police should be measured. 
The first two sections of this article deal with the historical devel-
opment of controls over public police in England and the United 
States. It is the thesis of the first section that a centralized police system 
was adopted in England with considerable reluctance, despite an ob-
vious need for the replacement of the existing methods for dealing 
with crime and disorder. This reluctance was overcome only by an 
agreement to impose strict controls and limitations on police power. 
Our discussion of public police in the United States concludes that 
4. RAND. supra note 2. 
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Americans, who were perhaps even more hostile than the English to 
the establishment of police forces, also turned to police when tradi-
tional institutions proved inadequate to deal with urban unrest in the 
mid-nineteenth century. Unlike the centralized English police forces, 
American police forces were kept under local jurisdiction. A conse-
quence of such fragmentation has been the institution of a wide variety 
of controls which have been tried sporadically in the United States 
during the past hundred years. However, the recognition of the need 
for and the imposition of controls has paralleled the growth in the 
size and importance of public police forces in the United States. 
The last sections of this article examine the controls private po-
lice in the United States are subjected to, and show that there has 
been, in fact, very little control exercised. The few controls that have 
been imposed have seldom dealt with the significant issues. They have 
not reflected the same areas of concern that have been aroused over 
the public police. This disparity reflects attitudes that may have once 
been appropriate when the numbers and scope of employment of 
private police were limited but such conditions no longer prevail. 
These last sections also show that the controls which currently exist 
vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. On the whole, they are 
inadequate to provide the public with protection against abuses of 
power by private police. 
The most universal device adopted by states in dealing with pri-
vate police has been the imposition of requirements for bonding. A 
special survey was conducted of state agencies responsible for the 
handling of these bonds. The results showed that in many instances 
these agencies had no information as to how often aggrieved members 
of the public resorted to suits on these bonds. And, where information 
was available, it indicated that such suits, or even complaints, were 
rarely brought. 
Another survey was made of the attorneys general of all states. 
Their views were sought as the principal state government official 
concerned with all aspects of law enforcement. The bulk of them can-
didly admitted that present regulation of private police was unsatis-
fac!ory. They also concluded that significant improvement in the pat-
tern of regulation was not an immediate prospect. The results of 
the bonding survey and the survey of state attorneys general present 
empirical data to support the validity of the conclusion of the Rand 
study, and of this study, that more comprehensive and meaningful 
controls over private police are desirable and necessary in light of 
their importance in contemporary society. 
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I. CREATION OF THE FIRST MODERN POLICE FOROE IN 
ENGLAND 
During the period from the death of Elizabeth I in 1603 to the 
establishment of the London Metropolitan Police in 1829, England 
was transformed from a rural nation into a modern industrial one. 
Although comprehensive statistics on crime were not compiled until 
after 1800, there are many indications that a growth in crimes against 
property paralleled the industrialization and urbanization of Eng-
land.1I 
Even before 1800, the demonstrable inadequacy of England's 
crime prevention institutions had received attention. In 1785 the gov-
ernment attempted to create a police organization independent of the 
magistry. The London and Westminster Police Bill, introduced in 
Parliament in that year, disregarded the traditional rights and privi-
leges of the chartered City of London by treating it and the Metropolis 
as a single unit for police purposes.6 In addition, the proposed legisla-
tion expanded the powers of the constables in the areas of search and 
seizure and arrest of suspected criminals.7 The constables were to be 
subordinate to three commissioners appointed by the Crown and giv-
en justice of the peace status. The commissioner-justice positions 
were to be stipendiary, the salaries paid by the government.8 
So strong was the opposition to the creation of a centralized po-
lice independent of the magistry that the bill was withdrawn without a 
vote being taken.9 Part of the opposition to the bill came from individ-
uals and groups on whose power the police would have encroached. 
The inclusion of the City of London -threatened the zealously guarded 
powers of the City's mayor and alderman, whose resistance remained 
so strong that the City was not included under the 1829 police bill.10 
Most important, the bill's sweeping grant of power in the admin-
istration of justice to an independant magistry and constabulary 
which derived its power from the national government rather than 
local governmental units alienated large segments of population. 
Many feared that a centralized police force would subject Englishmen 
to a system of police surveillance like that of France, and that English 
5. 1 L. RADZINOWIcz, A HISTORY OF ENGUSH CluMINAL LAw AND ITS ADMINIS-
TRATION FROM 1750 143 (1948) [hereinafter cited as RADZINOWICZ]; J. TOBIAS, 
NINETEENTH CENTURY CRIME IN ENGLAND 81-82 (1972). 
6. 3 RADZINOWIcz, supra note 5, at 110. 
7. ld. at 114-15. 
8. Id. at 111-12. 
9. ld. at 121. 
10. 4 RADZINOWIcz, supra note 5, at 171. 
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liberties would be endangered thereby.u In 1829, although crime 
was widespread, the likelihood that a police force would be created in 
London or anywhere else in England appeared remote. Yet in that 
year Parliament adopted Robert Peel's plan to establish a police force 
for the Metropolis of London. The question that immediately arises is, 
why did Peel's bill succeed? 
Undoubtedly Peel's political astuteness played a significant part 
in the bill's passage. For example, he purposely limited the scope of 
his bill to the Metropolis of London, so that it did not face the formida-
ble opposition of the City's officials. But the answer to this question 
also lies in the changes that had taken place in England by 1829, 
for England had experienced widespread economic and social unrest, 
largely the result of industrialization. When domestic uprisings, oc-
curred, the threat to national security served as a justification for 
using the army against the rebels.12 The army was the government's 
primary means of dealing with the sporadic riots of hosiery knitters, 
weavers and other workers in the cloth industry which began in 
1811-1813 and continued unti11818Y 
After Napoleon's defeat in 1815, the government found it more 
difficult to use the military to quell civil disturbances. Popular fear 
and dislike of the army was reflected in opposition to billeting in 
private lodgings and later in barracks throughout the country.14 
Consequently, other means of maintaining public order were sought. 
The civil institutions traditionally charged with keeping the peace 
fared badly when used in civil disorders. By 1800, local militia, 
paid out of land taxes, were composed of members of the lower ranks 
of society. OCyasionally they sided with the rioters, but even when 
they did not, discipline was so poor that they were considered unde-
pendable protectors of property and keepers of the peace. 15 
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, attempts 
were made to revive the posse comitatus, which was changed from its 
onginal form of a group of citizens assembled at a moment's notice 
11. For an example of the popular resistance to a centralized police force on the 
French model see 1 E. HALBVY, A HISTORY OF TIlE ENGLISH PEOPLE 39 (1924), 
citing Letters to Ivy, December 27, 1811, where one Englishman wrote: 
They have an admirable police at Paris but they pay dear enough. 
I had rather half-a-dozen people's throats should be cut in Ratcliff 
Highway every three or four years than be subject to domiciliary 
visits, spies, and all the rest of Fouche's contrivances. 
12. C. RErrn, BRITISH POLICE AND THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL 27 (1943). 
13. 4 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 5, at 122-23. 
14. E. HALEVY, supra note 11, at 63 fI. 
15. 4 RADZINOWIcz, supra note 5, at 110. 
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to pursue felons into a group of men instructed in the use of weapons 
and military techniques to be used when summoned by a magistrate 
to control an uprising. HI In the final analysis, however, only the army 
was considered trustworthy and effective in the event of rebellion. 
Beginning with the Luddite riots in 1811 the army was employed 
regularly as the "police force of industrial England."17 
Opposition to the use of the army in civil disturbances was not 
confined to a single class. The size of the army, its unsettled relation to 
civil authority, the danger of mutiny, and the threat to liberty posed by 
maintaining a large standing army in peacetime and quartering 
troops in the countryside were issues in Parliament in the late 1820s.18 
Even the conservative Duke of Wellington, while reiterating his faith 
in the loyalty and effectiveness of the army, wrote in 1823 that an 
alternative had to be found.19 
The prospect of social upheaval and the failure of traditional 
means of keeping the peace brought home to British leaders what 
even the most alarming criminal statistics had apparently failed to 
demonstrate-that a police force was necessary. But they saw its 
function not so much as fighting crime as in filling the void in the 
preservation of public order created by the failure of the militia and 
yeomanry and general dissatisfaction with the army as a means of 
achieving this end. As a result, the primary purpose of police work in 
the nineteenth century was the maintenance of order; the prevention 
and detection of crime remained secondary until much later. 20 
Robert Peel, the Prime Minister credited with the founding of 
the Metropolitan Police of London, regarded it as an experiment 
which, if successful, would be the model for a national police system.2~ 
But it was by no means certain that the police would be allowed to 
continue even long enough to demonstrate that they merited imita-
tion. Peel's Tory government fell late in 1830, and successive Whig 
governments, though unwilling to abolish the police outright, adopt-
ed various tactics designed to curb their effectiveness. The effect of 
public hostility toward and distrust of the police acted as a rigorous 
control on the exercise of police authority. Moreover, controls were 
built into the very structure of the police force. Although intended to 
16. ld. at 107-10. 
17. ld. at 123. 
18. ld. at 153-55. 
19. ld. at 157. 
20. J. MARTIN & G. WILSON, THE POLICE: A STUDY IN MANPOWER 7 (1969). 
21. !f. RADZINOWlcz, supra note 5, at 159-60. 
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be non-military in organization, composition and appearance,22 they 
turned to military organization as a means of maintaining internal 
discipline in the force. A chain of command was established, running 
from the commissioners through superintendents, inspectors and ser-
geants, to the constables who walked the beat in the seventeen police 
districts into which the Metropolis was divided.23 The activities of 
every member of the force were supervised. Superint~ndents, who 
were responsible for all activities of the men in their divisions, submit-
ted detailed reports to the commissioners, especially when police con-
duct was called into question. These reports were subject to scrutiny 
by the commissioners and served as the basis of their reports to the 
Home Office.24 
Another control was -the imposition of high standards of person-
al behavior on constables, with dismissal for failure to maintain these 
standards. The commissioners established stringent, objective criter-
ia for judging recruits and refused to allow police positions to be filled 
through the patronage system, by then a national scandal. Prospective 
constables had to supply character references as well as meet physical 
and mental requirements, among them literacy: 25 Although there were 
more applications than positions available, dismissals and resignations 
produced a high turnover of police personnel in the early 1830s. 
Drunkenness led to a significantly large number of dismissals.26 
Dismissal from the force could also result from an investigation 
of individual police conduct on the basis of a complaint from a private 
citizen. In the early years of the Metropolitan Police, its commission-
ers required that every citizen's complaint be investigated internally 
and established procedures for investigation.27 Constables were also 
subject to trial in the magistrates' courts for excesses committed in the 
line of duty. Since these courts were generally hostile to the police, 
and since individual constables had to pay the costs of legal defense, 
civil liability operated as a rigorous and sometimes patently unjust 
form of control. 28 
Conscious of the public fear of and hostility toward the military, 
London took the final step in "civilianizing" the Metropolitan Police: 
constables, even those who patrolled outlying districts, were not to 
22. C. RElTII, supra note 12, at 35. 
23. ld. at 36-37. 
24. ld. at 92-94. Reith quotes several examples of these reports. 
25. T. CruTCHLEY, A HISTORY OF POLICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 52 (1967). 
26. 4 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 5, at 1<i6. 
27. C. RElTII, supra note 12,.at 63. 
28. 4 RADzrNOWIcz, supra note 5, at 63; C. REITH, supra note 22, at 47. 
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carry firearms.29 The only visible symbol of the constable's authority 
was a wooden baton or truncheon, and directives issued by the com-
missioners warned that even this was to be used with restraint. . 
The General InstructionsS° distributed to every man on the force 
inculcated the constables with a sense of the precariousness of their 
position and the necessity of taking no action that could be interpreted 
as overstepping their authority. The object of the police, the instruc-
tions began, was to prevent crime. The commissioners would base 
their judgment of the effectiveness of the police not on the number of 
criminals apprehended, but on the absence of crime in the area under 
their controJ.31 But restraint was of primary importance in achieving 
this highly desirable goal. "In the novelty of the present establish-
ment," the Commissioners of Police warned, "particular care is to be 
taken that the constables . . . do not form false notions of their 
duties and powers." The General Instructions elaborated on the con-
stable's duty to be "civil and obliging to all people of every rank and 
class" and admonished him to "remember that there is no qualifica-
tion so indispensable to a police-officer as a perfect command of his 
temper, never suffering himself to be moved. . . by any language or 
threats that may be used. . . ."32 Metropolitan Police were used to 
restore order when civil disturbances occurred in and around London. 
In May, 1833, they were ordered to disperse a meeting of workers at 
Cold Bath Fields, near London. Although there are conflicting re-
ports as to the amount of force used by both sides, it is certain that 
one constable was fatally wounded during the disturbance.33 After 
receiving reports on the incident, the commissioners prepared a 
memorandum for distribution among the constables. In it they 
warned that if subsequent investigation revealed the constables had 
exceeded their duty or "committed themselves by a wanton or violent 
exercise of their power," they would be punished severely by the com-
missioners, in addition to suffering "the penal consequences to which 
they are liable by law." The commissioners concluded by taking 
the . opportunity of impressing strongly on the 
mind of every individual that his first duty as a 
constable is to learn self command, that he must 
not allow himself to be provoked by offensive or 
29. 4 RADzlNOWIcz, supra note 5, at 163. With permission, constables carried 
sabers on dangerous missions. Inspectors carried pocket pistols. 
30. C. REITII, supra note 12, at 47, quoting GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS (1829). 
31. Id. 
,32. Id. 
33. Id. 
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insulting language. 34 
The commissioners' memorandum reflects the pressures of the 
British attitude toward the police. From the outset the Metropolitan 
police were forced to perform the function of maintaining public or-
der in addition to their crime prevention and detection functions. As a 
result, they were in the public eye at a time when Englishmen of all 
classes distrusted public authority. The controls imposed on the po-
lice were the logical consequence of their ambivalent position in Brit-
ish society. If societal attitudes toward police have mellowed over 
time, constables have nevertheless continued to be saddled with the 
limitations imposed when they were still an experiment. 
ill. POLICE IN AMERICA 
It is not surprising that early American police systems resembled 
their English counterparts-the sheriff, constable and watch.35 Gen-
erally, the sheriff served in unincorporated areas, the constable in 
towns and villages. The constable's position was difficult to fill. The 
office had been appointive in England, but became elective in the 
United States until the early part of the nineteenth century.36 A man 
elected constable could usually escape serving by paying a fine, and 
many did SO.37 The constable's duties were many and varied, the pay 
was poor, the hours long and the prestige associated with the office 
low.38 However, the constable was an essential office of local govern-
ment since, in addition to his peacekeeping duties, he also served ad-
ministrative functions for the courts.39 Constables wore neither uni-
forms nor identifying badges.40 Unlike a private citizen, a constable 
could arrest without a warrant, and he alone could execute a warrant 
issued by a magistrate. So long as he acted reasonably, he was im-
mune from liability for false arrest.41 Supervision was exercised by 
the town authorities or the magistrates. 42 With the beginning of the 
annual appointments of constables and the abolition of the elective 
office, the constables became professional law enforcement officers 
34. C. RErnI, supra note 12, at 150, quoting Police Order, May 27, 1833. 
35. B. FOSDICK, AMERICAN POLICE SySTEMS 58 (1969). 
36. B. SMrnI, POLICE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 71 (1960). 
37. For a description of the fee system in use in Boston in the mid-nineteenth 
century for payment of constables see R. LANE, POLICING THE CITY: BOSTON, 1822-
1885, at 9 (1971). 
38. J. RiCHARDSON, THE NEW YORK POLICE 7 (1970). 
39. S. BACON, THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF AMElUCAN MUNICIPAL POLICE 7 
(1939) (unpublished thesis in Yale University Library). 
40. J. RiCHARDSON, supra note 38, at 19. 
41. [d. at 17-18. 
42. R. LANE, supra note 37, at 9. 
442 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol5/iss2/7
WHO'S WATCHING THE WATCHMAN? 
during the 1800S.43 
The first night watch was formed in Boston in 1634.44 Thereafter, 
every major city established its own night watch. Serving as a 
watchman, like serving as a constable, was an obligation owed by 
every male citizen over the age of eighteen unless he fell into an ex-
empt category or paid a substitute.45 Attracting men of high caliber to 
serve on the watch was difficult. Since any citizen with enough money 
to do so hired a substitute, the positions were filled by people willing 
to take the low pay. Most watchmen assumed the position in addition 
to their regular occupations by day.46 Consequently, the history of the 
watch is punctuated by complaints that they slept while on duty. In 
1757 the New York City Gazette described the watch as a 
parcel of idle, drinking, vigilant Snorers, who 
never quell'd any nocturnal Tumult in their 
Lives; (nor as we can learn, were ever the dis-
coverers of a Fire breaking out,) but would, per-
haps, be as ready to join in a Burglary as any 
Thief in Christendom. A happy Set indeed, to 
defend the right and populous City against the 
Terrors of the night.47 
Watchmen were also objects of ridicule by the citizenry. They were 
called "Leatherheads," a derisive term which referred to the leather 
helmets worn by some.48 
The powers of the night watch were more limited than those of 
the constables. They did not have police powers and could arrest only 
if a crime was committed in their presence, or if they were acting un-
der the direction of a police officer.49 They had authority to question 
any person suspected of a wrongdoing and to arrest and take him 
before a justice of the peace. 50 
As the urban population grew, the night watch became inade-
quate to deal with the problems of the cities. Civil authorities tried 
increasing the numbers of watchmen, and when, that failed, they cre-
43. ld. 
44. S. BACON, supra note 39, at 9. 
45. R. LANE, supra note 37, at 10. 
46. S. BACON, supra note 39, at 115. 
47. J. RICHARDSON, supra note 38, at 10, quoting New York City Gazette, Feb. 
21,1757. 
48. B. FOSDICK, -supra note 35, at 61. 
49. J. RICHARDSON, supra note 38, at 11l. 
50. R. LANE, supra note 37, at 10. 
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ated a day force separate from the night watch. Boston adopted the 
plan in 1838, New York in 1844.51 The two forces, however, proved 
no more effective than the single. one. 
From the beginning there were many weaknesses in the consta-
ble and watch system. The watch, whether composed of ordinary citi-
zens or appointees, operated with a high degree of inefficiency. The 
constables, and sometimes watchmen, were also hampered by the fact 
that they were compensated by fees rather than a salary. 52· In fact, 
the fee system led to serious problems throughout the system. Co-
operation among officers was infrequent since it might result in their 
having to split a fee. They pursued those duties which would allow 
them to reap the greatest benefits. They searched for individuals 
for money even if there were no warrants out for them. When stolen 
property was involved, officers were less concerned with the offenders 
than with recovering the propertY-a more lucrative employment of 
their time. In some cases officer and thief cooperated to stage a 
crime and then split the reward money. 53 
Other internal problems arose from the very nature of the watch 
system. Since the personnel operated on a rotation basis, officers 
could learn little about the people or areas they watched. 54 They re-
ceived no training in handling emergencies and gained little experi-
ence on the job. Because watchmen received their jobs from politi-
cians, "they made no attempt to interfere with the saloonkeepers and 
gangs of 'shoulder hitters' who provided the bulk of the politicians' 
support."55 Since the appointments were controlled by the town au-
thorities, the watchman might find himself out of a job after a change 
of parties. All these conditions produced low morale and lack of unity 
among the watch. 
Constables fared little better than the watchmen because' they 
were usually appointed on an annual basis and also had to spend a 
great deal of time seeking reappointment by currying favor with their 
sponsors. 56 Even when constables began to be treated as profession-
als, their ranks were peopled with many incompetent and inefficient 
individuals. 
The basic deficiencies of the watch and constable systems ren-
51. B. FOSDICK, supra note 35, at 62. 
52. S. BACON, supra note 39, at 1. 
53. J. RICHARDSON, supra note 38, at 30-31. 
54. S. BACON, supra note 39, at 426. , 
55. J. RICHARDSON, supra note 38, at 36. 
56. [d. 
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dered them ill-prepared to deal with the unrest that occurred in many 
. American cities during the first half of the nineteenth century. Nu-
merous factors contributed to urban unrest. Among them were the 
continuous influx of immigrants into American cities and the tensions 
which arose between them and the native-born. In addition, riots oc-
curred over labor and wage conditions, rivalry among fire companies, 
and abolitionist activities. 57 In most cases, city governments had to 
call for the aid of the state militia to quell the riots. 58 
The riots of the 1840s provided an impetus for finding a more 
effective means of dealing with urban unrest. As a result, the first day 
and night police force in the United States was established in New 
York City in 1845. Other major cities soon followed suit. The estab-
lishment of the police force was not without opposition from many 
quarters, however. 
The Search for Effective Controls 
Like the English, Americans were faced with a conflict between 
the need for effective law enforcement and the fear of a standing 
army. They too sought to resolve this conflict by developing controls 
on the police. In England, the Metropolitan Police were directly 
under the jurisdiction of Parliament. In the United States, however, 
local involvement in and control of the police was maintained.59 As 
a result, American police forces developed close ties to local political 
processes. In the first decades following the organization of the new 
forces, administrative controls were lodged in the hands of the mayor 
and city council. 60 This method of selection heavily favored political 
appointments. The positions were used to satisfy patronage demands 
and tenure was short.61 Generally, the chief of police was a figure-
head. The real control was exercised by each ward captain. Disci-
pline among the wards varied "according to the attention or skill and 
tact" shown by the captain.62 
Political involvement in partisan politics and a lack of internal 
discipline were not the only problems. From the outset, tenure was 
limited both to avoid the possible establishment of a standing army 
57. ld. at 474, 538; R. LANE, supra note 37, at 22; J. RICHARDSON, supra note 38, 
at 28. 
58. J. RICHARDSON, supra note 38, at 28. 
59. G. CARTE, AUGUST VOLLNER AND THE ORIGINS OF POLlCE PROFESSIONALISM 
28 (1972) (unpublished thesis in University of California at Berkeley Library). 
60. B. SMITH, supra note 36, at 184. 
61. B. FOSDICK, supra note 35, at 68. 
62. ld. 
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and to control the police officers more effectively. Eventually the in-
appropriateness of short tenure became apparent and in 1853 the 
New York legislature approved tenure for good behavior.63 Residen-
cy requirements were also used to control the new forces. To ensure a 
feeling of responsibility to the community, policemen had to be resi-
dents of the city as well as the ward in which they were appointed and 
in which they served.64 This requirement also encouraged a greater 
involvement in local politics. 
In the first years, the police were undisciplined and unregulated 
because of their high degree of involvement in local politics, their 
short term of office and the lack of internal administration. One of the 
best illustrations of this undisciplined attitude was in the conflict over 
the issue of uniforms. Uniformed police were first urged to make the 
police more visible to citizens seeking help. It was also thought that 
uniforms would improve internal administration by making police-
men more visible to their superiors. Members of the forces bitterly 
opposed the move because it "conflicted with their notions of inde-
pendence and self-respect." In New York policemen dismissed for 
their refusal to wear a uniform even tpok their case to the courts, 
which ruled in favor of the commissioners.65 Boston police were final-
ly outfitted by 1859, New York police by 1860.66 
Each year the involvement in partisan politics increased, bring-
ing new changes in personnel and policies.61 Moreover, conditions in 
the cities -and country as a whole were growing progressively worse in 
the years preceding the Civil War. The police, ill-disciplined and 
usually disorganized, found it difficult to deal with these conditions. 
Therefore, control of the forces was gradually taken over by inde-
pendent administrative boards, beginning in the middle decades of 
the nineteenth century. The first board was created in Philadelphia in 
1850.68 The boards consisted of judges, mayors, city councilmen and 
private citizens. Most had only minimal experience with police forces; 
frequently their efforts to deal with the police were inexpert and med-
dlesome.69 Police management continued to be uncertain and inef-
fective in the face of political involvement. Toward the end of the 
nineteenth century, control of local police forces was passed to the 
63. J. RICHA'RDSON, supra note 38. 
64. ld. at 49. 
6S. ld. at 6S. 
66. R. LANE, supra note 37, at lOS. 
67. B. SMTIH, supra note 36, at 184. 
68. B. FOSDICK, supra note 3S, at 77. 
69. B. SMITIl, supra note 36, at 185. 
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state legislatures.7o 
The scheme was doomed from the beginning. The laws sought 
to be enforced were state laws, for it was believed that control by the 
state would assure equal enforcement. However, laws were not ap-
plied uniformly because the legislatures were controlled by the rural 
areas at the expense of larger cities. Also, political involvement re-
mained at the heart of all problems. In 1857, a New York newspaper 
raged: 
We all know that ... the police seem power-
less for good; that bold and dangerous criminals 
were never so bold and dangerous, that life and 
property were never so insecure; that gambling 
and prostitution and illegal trade were never so 
open and shameless; that the public sentiment 
of danger from violence was never so acute, nor 
with so much reason. And why is it? Because 
the policemen are politicians, getting the places 
as the reward of political service; because they 
dare not or will not offend the fellows who have 
fought shoulder to shoulder with them at the 
polls. 71 
Gradually, most cities realized the shortcomings of the plan and 
abandoned it. They looked for better ways to control the police forces 
in order to ensure a more organized, responsive system. 
The desire for local control provided the impetus for another 
solution. In the first decade of the twentieth century commission gov-
ernment charters were adopted by many cities. The system combined 
executive and legislative powers in a commission elected by popular 
vote. The various departments of city government were then distrib-
uted among the members of the commission. Because supervision of 
department activities was combined with other city services, control 
was rendered fragmentary and weak. Thus, the concerted attention 
critical to a well organized and efficient policy system was absent. 
Most cities have abandoned the system, and its readoption does not 
appear likely.72 Police administrators are now appointed by most city 
governments, rather than being elected.73 Some of the political prob-
lems are thereby avoided, but police supervision still remains an issue. 
70. ld. at 186. 
71. B. FOSDICK, supra note 35, at 81, quoting New York Tribune, Feb. 5, 1857. 
72. ld. at 187. 
73. ld. at 188. 
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A number of other controls were not developed until later in the 
twentieth century. The majority were attempts to improve the quality 
of the personnel selected for police work, through education, training 
and inducements to be a "good" police officer, such as compensation 
and promotions. External controls-police review boards, judicial 
processes and ombudsmen-have also been developed to regulate the 
behavior of police. Currently, the public is still attempting to develop 
effective controls that will limit the powers they have given the police. 
There are several types of internal controls that regulate police. 
One of the first to appear in the twentieth century was formal train-
ing.74 Police training schools remained rare and negligible in effect, 
however, until well into the 1920s.75 The greatest spur to the develop-
ment of an effective police selection process was the publication of the 
Wickersham Commission report in 1931. In that study, it was re-
ported that: "1) police corruption was widespread and training was 
almost non-existent; 2) inefficiency was the rule rather than the 
exception; 3) communication systems were ineffective; 4) political 
interference in police operations hampered honest enforcement ef-
forts; and 5) police executives were often ill-suited to handle their 
jobs."76 Police departments moved to correct some of these problems 
by improving working conditions with the establishment of a merit 
promotion system and with attempts to lessen the effects of external 
politics. Police training and education as methods of professionalizing 
the forces also gained wide acceptance at this time. 
Other methods of improving the personnel have included the 
development of background checks, medical examinations, tests of 
physical agility and prowess, oral examinations and written civil serv-
ice tests. In the past twenty years, the use of psychiatric screening and 
psychological testing has become an important factor in screening out 
undesirable individuals.77 
Employee participation, job mobility (vertical and horizontal) 
and standarization of positions have improved the quality of person-
nel and made the position of police officer a more desirable one. 78 
Inducements to stay a "good" policeman have also increased since the 
beginning of the century. A rise in status, compensation (salaries 
74. The first training schools were opened in the 1890's. W. Bopp & D. ScHuLTZ, 
A SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw ENFORCEMENT 84 (1972). 
75. B. SMITH, supra note 36, at 131. 
76. W. Bopp & D. SCHULTZ, supra note 74, at 107. 
77. J. SNIDBE & M. HOMA, THE URBAN POLICEMAN IN TRANsmON 5 (1973). 
78. G. BERKELEY, ThE DEMOCRATIC POLICEMAN 29 (1969). 
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have risen slowly but steadily since 1910) and promotion on the basis 
of criteria related as closely as possible to the police function and goals 
have been some of the improvements.79 
Internal controls are perhaps the most important method of reg-
ulating police conduct. Officers almost always act individually. Only 
in recent years have police departments attempted to improve their 
administrative effectiveness. Sinc~ the formation of urban police 
forces in the United States, the chain of command has paralleled that 
of the military. This practice continues today although it is now less 
emphasized. 
The major types of external controls are judicial action, police 
review boards and ombudsmen. The most significant of these, of 
course, is judicial action. There are now six judicial remedies open 
to individuals to punish improper police behavior. They include either 
civil or criminal suits against individual policemen, actions aganst 
the department or municipality, injunctions against certain specified 
activities of a department and actions under the federal civil rights 
acts. It is possible also to allege a defense to a criminal charge by 
showing discriminatory enforcement of the law. Further restraints on 
police actions might be made through the use of the exclusionary rule. 
The independent police review board was originally established 
to hear public grievances against individual officers. Although the 
ideas originated in the 1930s, the first board was not established until 
1958 in ,Philadelphia. so Impetus for the creation of boards in other 
cities in the 1960s came primarily from minority groups who felt they 
had little opportunity to have their complaints heard. The police have 
been greatly opposed to the formation of such boards. Although the 
newness of these boards has precluded the availability of substantial 
data on their effectiveness, the subject has generated much explora-
tion. Generally, though, the boards have many inadequacies and their 
overall success is in doubt. Sl 
m. THE PRIVATE POLICE INDUSTRY 
The preceding sections make it clear that the growth of public 
police has been characterized by a concomitant growth in controls 
over the exercise of police power. What has been the pattern of regula-
79. ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE FuNCTION 147 (1972). 
80. W. Bopp & D. ScHuLTZ, supra note 74, at 145. 
81. See Berger, Law Enforcement Control: Checks and Balances, 4 CONN. L. 
REv. 467 (1971). 
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tion and control over private police activity? The following sections, 
which represent an update and expansion of the Rand study, set 
forth a detailed analysis of developments in the past five years. 
The Rand study, for instance, left unanswered the question of how to 
evaluate the various systems of private police regulation which do 
exist, for the study failed to provide any standard by which the con-
trols imposed on private police by the respective states could be 
measured for adequacy or inadequacy. It merely assumed that some 
controls were in order and advocated state action on a series of recom-
mendations. 
The standard adopted by the authors grows out of the recogni-
tion that the American tradition has been characterized by rather ex-
tensive control over the public police power. That condition has 
convinced the authors that the controls over public police are the 
standard by which controls over private police are to be measured. 
This is not to suggest that every control or regulation of public police 
should be applied identically to private police. But, what is recom-
mended is that the pattern of regulation over private police activity 
needs to be substantially parallel to that of public police. The data that 
have been assembled in the following sections provide a basis for con-
trasting present private police regulation with English and American 
regulation of public police described above. 
Security and Patrol Guards 
The various statutory enactments utilize the following terms in 
specifying who are security guards: contract guards, patrol guards, 
watchmen, armed guards, private guards, patrolmen, special officers, 
armored car personnel and alarm service personnel. Though the 
nomenclature differs, the fundamental services rendered by these in-
dividuals remain the same. Guards "protect or attempt to protect 
persons or property from damage, injury, loss or other criminal act." 
Patrolmen perform identical functions as guards "but do so at a 
number of different physical locations; they usually travel (on foot 
or in a vehicle) on public property between these 10cations."82 The 
contract guard or patrol agencies referred to in the statutes encom-
pass the individuals, partnerships and corporations which provide 
privately employed guards or patrolmen for a fee. 
Thus, the security and patrol guards provide one consistent 
function for society-protection of property and persons. Yet, an in-
82. 3 RAND, supra note 2, at 2. 
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finite variety of situations arise wherein many different services of 
such individuals are required. The diversity of circumstances de-
mands ever-shifting degrees of reaction and responsiveness in order 
to furnish adequate protection. It is this activity which is under scruti: 
ny, because the absence of uniform and orderly controls can and has 
permitted widespread abuse.83 
The abuse or misuse of authority conferred upon security and 
patrol guards in part comes from the lack of any type of regulation in 
sixteen states.84 Of the thirty-five states which do mention security 
and patrol guards, five states have adopted provisions which are total-
ly devoid of regulatory features.85 Two of these latter states merely 
acknowledge the right of cities and counties to have security and pa-
trol guards and to adopt whatever measures they deem necessary for 
control or guidance.86 
When laws do exist, the statutory language is often misleading as 
to specific coverage. For example, twenty-two out of the thirty-five 
statutes embrace other spheres of the private police industry, e.g., de-
tective agencies and contract investigation.87 This broadened mantle 
has resulted in 9onfusion in applying the statutes and inefficiency in 
interpreting them. 
The lack of uniform nationwide coverage has also resulted in a 
diversity of state regulatory agencies the function of which is to carry 
out the letter of their respective state statutes. The Department of 
State Police is named as the regulatory agency in five states.88 Four 
other states leave the task to the Secretary of State,89 and five others 
turn the job over to the State Board of Private Detectives.9o The rest of 
the security and patrol guard agencies and employees are under the 
83. For a discussion of control of private police in California in greater depth see 
Private Police in Califorma: A Legislative Proposal, 5 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 115 
(1975). 
84. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Idaho, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, 
Washington and Wyoming. Note: space limitations preclude citation of all the 
state statutes suIVeyed. A full list of the relevant statutes can be obtained by writ-
ing to: Administrative Assistant, Golden Gate Law Review, 536 Mission Street., 
San Francisco, California. 
85. Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Virginia. 
86. Missouri and Virginia. Virginia requires that the city or county have a popu-
lation of over 150,000. 
87. Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Mary-
land, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Da-
kota, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. 
88. Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Maryland and Michigan (wherein local pub-
lic officials must approve the granting of the state license if the business has an office 
in that locality). 
89. Florida, Nebraska, New York and West Virginia. 
90. Hawaii, Nevada, North Carolina, Texas and Vermont 
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authority of some other bureaucratic agency in state government. 91 
Most state agencies require security and patrol guard agencies, 
corporations and other business enterprises to be licensed. The licens-
ing requirement, however, is basically for registration rather than for 
regulatory purposes, and often does not include employees of licen-
sees at all. 
This means that approximately one-third of the nation neither 
recognizes nor accounts for security and patrol guard agencies and 
personnel. The rest of the nation, having established some degree of 
regulatory policy, is oddly divided as to who should oversee it. In 
short, no comprehensive, uniform plan exists relative to licensing and/ 
or registering one of the most crucial segments of private police. The 
nonexistence of this primary control inevitably leads to the absence 
or inadequacy of other essential means by which society should watch 
its watchmen. This includes both external and internal measures. 
To illustrate, it is necessary to return to those states which do have 
licensing provisions. 
First, the requisites for obtaining a license are cursory. In only 
eight states are written examinations required prior to securing a li-
cense.92 In two other states, examinations are required only at the 
discretion of the director of the appropriate regulatory agency.93 
And, these examinations are generally limited to applicants for a li-
cense, notably excluding employees of such persons-the individuals 
who have the contact with society. 
Of greater import, however, is the prerequisite of some relevant 
experience prior to making an application for a license. The length 
and type of such experience is greatly varied, indicating an absence of 
understanding as to the knowledge and skills necessary for a rational 
functioning of the security and patrol industry. Previous employment 
in one of the following occupations is mentioned most often as provid-
ing the requisite experience: full-time licensed investigator; public 
police officer;94 sheriff or deputy; police officer engaged in investiga-
, 
91. Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota (Commissioner of Public Safety); North Da-
kota (Attorney General); Ohio, Wisconsin (Dep't of Commerce, Licensing Divi-
sion); California (Bureau of Collection and Investigative Services); New Mexico 
(State Bureau of Private Investigation); Arkansas (Investigator Licensing Board); 
North Carolina (Private Protective Services Board); Hawaii (Board of Private Detec-
tives and Guards); Nevada (Detective Licensing Board); Georgia, Texas, Vermont 
(State Board of Private Detectives); Louisiana, lllinois (Dep't of Registration and 
Education); and Maine (Governor). 
92. Hawaii, lllinois, Iowa, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Ohio and Texas. 
93. California and North Carolina. 
94. Illinois and Vermont require that the individual have held a rank higher than 
patrolman. 
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tive or detective service; private security employee; F.B.I. or state bu~ 
reau investigator; supervision in industrial security guard or patrol 
service; and insurance adjuster. 
The length of prior experience required is as diverse as the type 
called for. The breakdown is as follows: three states require only one 
year of experience;95 seven states ask for two years of experience;96 
four states call for three years of experience;97 five states demand four 
to five years of experience;98 and three other states have some combi~ 
nation,99 depending upon the type of experience and whether the ap~ 
plicant has a college or university education. Nebraska asks for only 
some experience consonant with the public interest. New Jersey alone 
has established that employees of licensees must also have five years of 
experience or training in order to qualify in their field. 
The age requirement for securing a license is relatively low when 
compared to the length of experience required. For individuals apply~ 
ing as licensees of security and patrol businesses, six states have estab~ 
lished a minimum age of eighteen;loo one state defines twenty years of 
age as the minimum;lol twelve states call for the applicant to be twen~ 
ty~one years of age;102 nine states make twenty~five years of age the 
minimum.lo3 Only four statutes mention any age requirement for em~ 
ployees,l°4 with Hawaii requiring the individual to be twenty-one 
years of age, Georgia and Wisconsin allowing an employee to be only 
eighteen, and Michigan calling for the employee to be twenty-one 
years old unless the regulatory agency gives permission to persons 
between eighteen and twenty-one. Interestingly, the eighteen-year~ 
old age minimum for licensees now established in six states have 
evolved since the 1970 Rand survey was made, although the experi~ 
ence requirements have remained constant. 
No educational level whatsoever is demanded, except in the Ha~ 
waii and Michigan statutes wherein licensees must be high school 
graduates (or the equivalent) and employees need only have com~ 
pleted the eighth grade. All other statutes are silent on this subject. 
95. California, Maine and New Mexico. 
96. Georgia, Indiana, Nevada, New York, Ohio, South Carolina and Vermont. 
97. Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania and Texas. 
98. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland and New Jersey. 
99. Michigan, North Carolina and West Virginia. 
100. California, Georgia, Iowa, North Carolina, North Dakota and South Caro-
lina. 
101. Maine. 
102. Arkansas, Florida, illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and Vermont. 
103. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New 
Jersey, New York and Wisconsin. 
104. Georgia, Hawaii, Michigan and Wisconsin. 
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In twenty-four states the applicant must also be a United States 
citizen.105 Five states require that the license applicant be a resident of 
the state for one year prior to making an application,106 while Con-
necticut, Georgia and Minnesota simply ask the applicant where his 
or her residence has been for the past five years. Except in Georgia 
and New Jersey, where both licensees and employees must be United 
States citizens, employees are not mentioned. 
For completion of the licensing procedure, twenty-five states de-
mand one to three photographs and/or sets of fingerprints from the 
license applicant.107 But only five states call for prospective employ-
ees of the licensee to submit these items to the licensing regulatory 
agency.10S The photographs and fingerprints are used by the regula-
tory agency, or some other designated body, to assist in running a 
criminal records check on the applicant. The above, along with three 
to five reference letters (again, required only for license applicants) 
attesting to "character," apparently provide the regulatory agencies 
with sufficient information to pass judgment for either granting or 
denying the license. 
Denial of a license may result from nonfulfillment of some or all 
of the aforementioned requirements, depending on the statutory lan-
guage. In addition, some states refuse to issue licenses on other 
grounds. "In many states grounds are characterized by phraseology 
such as 'not of good moral character, integrity, competency, reputa-
tion or honesty.' "109 Other bases frequently applied to deny licenses 
include prior felony convictions, falsified application information, a 
prior conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, having been 
adjudged mentally defective, receipt of a dishonorable discharge 
from military service, illegal use or possession of a dangerous weapon, 
and conviction of certain other crimes constituting misdemeanors. 
Five states are absolutely silent regarding any basis for denying a li-
cense.l1O Another ten states specify that only a felony conviction or a 
105. Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, Texas and Wisconsin. 
106. Hawaii, Indiana, Michigan, Texas (Texas actually requires state citizenship), 
and Wisconsin. Nevada requires the license applicant to have resided in the state 
for only six months. 
107. Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, llli-
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, Texas and West Virginia. 
108. Georgia, Michigan, New Mexico, North Carolina and Ohio. 
109. 3 RAND, supra note 2, at 9. 
110. Delaware, Louisiana, Missouri, Tennessee and Virginia. 
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lack of honesty, truthfulness and the like would serve as grounds for 
withholding a license.ll1 The rest of the statutes have varying combi-
nations of the above, with approximately only one-third of the states 
setting forth fully comprehensive and meaningful standards which 
must be adhered to. 
Generally, the grounds for suspension or revocation of a license 
are very similar for denial of a license, although of five states the bases 
for suspension or revocation are much broader and more detailed 
than those for denial.112 Failure to comply with and violation of the 
respective licensing provisions (e.g., falsification on applications, not 
maintaining a proper bond) are the most frequently. cited causes for 
suspension or revocation. Most states provide for a public hearing on 
the alleged offense as established by administrative procedure. From 
available data, the extent to which this avenue is utilized for rectifica-
tion or punishment appears unclear.113 However, when provided for, 
this method of control could and should be employed to maintain a 
watchful eye on private security guard and patrol agencies and their 
employees. 
Two other methods of control which exist in varying degrees en-
compass the amount of a license fee and the amount of a bond which 
must be posted upon securing a license. Individuals who obtain a li-
cense must pay an initial fee ranging from $10 to $750, with a renewal 
rate running about half of the original fee. The fee depends, too, upon 
whether an individual or a corporation is seeking licensing. The aver-
age fee per individual licensee appears to be in the $100-to-$200 
bracket. Employees are required (though infrequently) to pay a 
nominal $2-to-$10 registration fee. Louisiana's license fee runs from 
$150 to $200, depending on the amount of gross receipts of the busi-
ness. Three states do not mention fees at all.114 
Twenty-eight states will issue the license only after a surety bond 
has been posted with the regulatory agency. As with fees, the amount 
of the bond or insurance depends upon whether an individual or a 
corporation is applying for a license. For an individual, the amount 
required usually ranges from $2,000 to $3,000. Agencies or corpora-
tions have a higher rate: eight states require from $2,000 to $5,-
111. Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin. 
112. Florida, illinois, Indiana, Nevada and Texas. 
113. Penalties now provide for a fine of anywhere from $100 to $1,000 and/or 
six months to two years imprisonment. 
114. Missouri, Oklahoma and Virginia. 
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000;115 another eight require $5,000;116 and eleven more states de-
mand a $10,000 bondY7 Vermont requires a $25,000 bond,l1S and 
Ohio offers a choice-a $400,000 bond, or insurance of $100,000 
per person and $300,000 per occurrence for personal injury, plus 
$100,000 property damage coverage.119 It appears that the high 
bonding and insurance requirement is designed to cover abuse of 
authority by licensees and their agents if complaints are lodged against 
them. The rationale is that the more money it takes to safeguard or 
control licensing standards,the less likely it is that the personnel will 
misuse their authority. 
Bonding is not, however, a substitute for proper training pro-
grams and curricula, which could provide an infinitely greater 
amount of regulatory control over the actions of security personnel 
and their employees. As of July, 1974, only four states mention any 
kind of training as a prerequisite. Michigan simply prescribes training 
for licensed in-house security forces through the department of state 
police.120 In Ohio training is obligatory onlY,if the locality requires the 
security personnel to obtain a private police commission.121 Califor-
nia merely says firearms training will become mandatory under new 
regulations. Georgia, however, requires each licensee to have a com-
petent training officer and an adequate training program.122 
As is apparent, though, the internal controls are nebulous, spo-
radic, diverse, and wholly inadequate for the type of service and pro-
tection which security and guard agencies hold themselves out as pro-
viding. This is indeed crucial because only three states expressly deny 
security personnel legal authority above that of an ordinarycitizen.123 
Delaware and Hawaii grant their guard or patrol personnel the powyr 
to make arrests, while most other statutes extend this type of police au-
thority to guards only when they are on the property of the place 
where employed. . 
Twelve states do permit guards to carry concealed or dangerous 
115. California, Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Da-
kota and West Virginia. 
116. Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota and 
North Carolina. 
117. Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas and Wisconsin. 
118. V. STAT. ANN. § 35-9502. 
119. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4749.03(A)(4) (1973). 
120. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.1'85(31) (1967). ' 
121. OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 109.71, 109.78 (Additional Supp. 1973). This 
commission is unconnected with any state licensing or registration requirements for 
,private police except for armed personnel at educational institutions. 
122. GA. STATS. ANN. § 84-6505(b)(6) (1974). 
123. Arkansas. California and Ohio. 
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weapons if an additional license is obtained.124 The other states are 
silent on this subject. Eleven states permit security and patrol guards 
to have special identification cards, badges, and uniforms;125 four per-
mit identification cards and badges;126 and six permit special identifi-
cation cards.127 Due to all these privileges, private security and patrol 
guards assume the guise of public law enforcement officers, but are 
not subject to the regulations which have been established to control 
the public police. 
Private Detectives and Investigation Agencies 
Private detectives and investigation agencies are a familiar part 
of the growing numbers of individuals and businesses engaged in the 
private police industry. On a contract fee basis, investigative services 
that utilize the techniques available to public investigative agencies 
such as the F.B.I., state, and municipal police forces are available to 
the private sector. While the scope of the public police investigator's 
role is limited both to those areas serving the public need and by the 
amount of tax dollars allocated, and is subject to restraints such as the 
protection of constitutional rights, similar limitations are not placed 
on the private investigator. This absence of restraints is illustrated by 
the lack of uniformity in regulation by the individual states. 
Traditionally, private detective services have been used to ob-
tain information on individuals not readily or routinely available 
through public sources. Currently, and most frequently, this informa-
tion is solicited for either business or litigation purposes. While the 
need for private investigative services is real, the sophistication and 
range of modem investigation devices demands the establishment of 
standards equally applied and adhered to by both public and private 
police. Otherwise, abuses, particularly in the area of invasion of priva-
cy, are bound to occur. This need for uniformity becomes greater 
when viewed in light of state statutes that permit only ex-police offi-
cers the privilege of applying for private detective status. 
Where every public police force regardless of its nature is subject 
to state regulation, private detectives and investigative agencies are 
124. California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, lllinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina and Wisconsin. 
125. California, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York and Ohio. The uniforms must 
be "dissimilar" to those worn by public police, and the badges are supposed to state 
the company or agency for which the private security personnel works. 
126. Arkansas, Delaware, Iowa and Pennsylvania. 
127. Florida, lllinois, Indiana, Nevada, North Dakota and Texas. 
457 
25
Dralla: Private Police
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1975
GOLDEN GATE LAW REVIEW 
regulated at the state level in only thirty-five states.128 Whereas the 
local or state police commissioner is always responsible for the regula-
tion and administration of the local and state public police, regulation 
of the private detective industry is delegated to a variety of state -agen-
cies. Consequently, a variety of purposes are sought by the regulatory 
statutes, few of which tend to establish and maintain standards on an 
equal par with those required of their public counterparts. The types 
of agencies responsible for regulating licensing of this industry are as 
follows: 
Type of Agency Number of States 
Public law enforcement agencies129 12 
Revenue collecting agencies130 8 
Private detective boards131 6 
Secretary of State132 5 
Attorney General133 2 
Governor134 1 
Miscellaneous agencies135 3 
None at state leveP36 4 
One~third of the states regulate these services primarily as a reve-
nue raising device by requiring a license to do business. An equal 
proportion utilize law enforcement agencies for regulation. While 
statutes may be comparatively comprehensive in scope, choice of the 
regulating agency greatly affects the manner, sphere and direction of 
such regulation. The probability that a revenue collecting agency will 
have the expertise, interest and facilities to enforce the statute with 
respect to effectively regulating standards is minimal. Use of govern-
ment agencies whose primary purpose is other than regulation of law 
128. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jer-
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
sey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina. 
Ten states have no regulatory laws at all: Idaho, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah and Washington. Four states reg-
ulate, but leave the licensing to cities or non-state level agencies: Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, Virginia and Wyoming. Two states, Alabama and Alaska, regulate at 
the state level, but solely for the purpose of requiring a license and fee. 
129. Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina and South Carolina. 
130. Alabama, Alaska, California, Louisiana, New York, Ohio, Tennessee and 
Wisconsin. 
131. Georgia, Hawaii, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Vermont. 
132. Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Nebraska and West Virginia. 
133. Kansas and North Dakota. 
134. Maine. . 
135. Illinois, Maryland and the District of Columbia. 
136. Pennsylvania, RhOde Island, Virginia and Wyoming. 
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enforcement personnel further indicates an absence of proper con-
cern for the quality of statutorily established regulatory efforts. 
Six states137 use private detective boards comprised of individu-
als usually chosen from within the field to regulate the industry. Since 
the effectiveness of the statute is dependent upon the individuals cho-
sen to enforce it, the use of such individuals tends to promote the sta-
tus quo rather than create an impetus for the upgrading of standards 
and qualifications within the industry. On ·the other hand, the use of 
law enforcement agencies as the regulatory body gives the breadth of 
experience necessary to create and maintain parallel standards for 
public and private investigators, and at the same time, to utilize its 
expertise to provide a thorough evaluation of licensees according to 
statutory requirements. 
Finally, regulation through such disparate state agencies pro-
hibits any meaningful and effective compilation of data on the nature 
and character of the private detective and investigative field, both 
within the individual states and on a national basis. National statistics 
are consequently inaccurate and incomplete since data can be obtained 
only through cumulatively studying each of the states that does regu-
late this field and hypothesizing about the twelve states138 that do not. 
Further inaccuracies arise because the majority of statutes are 
ambiguous as to precisely who must obtain a license. In four states,139 
a licensee may employ unlicensed detectives without registering those 
individuals. South Carolina alone expressly provides that the licensee 
is the only member of the business to perform investigations.140 
The Degree of Detective or Investigator RegUlation 
An examination of the relevant state laws reveals that regulatory 
provisions exist in the general areas of individual qualifications, in-
dustrial standards, and revenue collecting requirements. Analysis 
of the degree of regulation in each of these areas by priority of con-
cern was determined by the frequency with which a specific qualifi-
cation was regulated. The priority of concern is indicative of th~ 
overall purpose and effectiveness of the statutes. 
At the outset, it should be noted that although thirty-five states 
technically regulate this field in some manner on the state level, regu-
137. Georgia, Hawaii, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Vermont. 
138. See note 128 supra. 
139. Arizona, North Dakota, Virginia and West Virginia. 
140. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 56-64/?1-.17 (1974). 
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lation in two other states is limited solely to the extent that a fee be 
paid in exchange for a license.141 The method of regulation varies ac-
cording to whether an investigative agency or individual private detec-
tive business is involved. Investigative agencies must be licensed in 
twenty-four states;142 in twelve states employees of these agencies 
must be registered or licensed, or must meet specific qualifications.u3 
Private detective businesses are licensed in sixteen states,144 and em-
ployees must be either registered or licensed, or must meet specific 
qualifications in fifteen states.145 
The most frequently cited requirement of the thirty-seven states 
is the payment of ·a license fee.146 Fees range from $10 up to $750, and 
depend on the nature of the license, agency or individual. Although 
the processing of the license and the fee payment do not seem mone-
tarily or financially prohibitive, the range of fees paid is inadequate to 
cover the cost of effectively regulating the field. Basic costs like record 
keeping and minimal evaluation of prospective licensees are barely 
covered by license fees. In general, license fees appear to be regulato-
ry, but in fact are not. This contention is further supported by the fact 
that in sixteen states147 additional minimal fees are charged for li-
cense renewal, registering employees; examination and application 
fees. 
The license period is of next greatest importance. Licenses are 
valid for one year in twenty-two states148 and two years in ten 
states,149 with three states not specifying the time period involved.150 
141. See note 128 supra. . 
142. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, 
Florida, DIinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne-
sota, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, South carolina, Tennessee, Ver-
mont, Virginia and Wisconsin. 
143. Arkansas, California, lllinois, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New 
Hampshire, New York, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wisconsin. 
144. Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Texas and West Virginia. 
145. Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania and 
Texas. 
146. All states but Idaho, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington and 
Wyoming. 
147. Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, lllinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, West Vir-
ginia and Wisconsin. 
148. Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, lllinois, Iowa, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Da-
,}cota, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia and Wis-
consin. 
149. California, Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, New York and Pennsylvania. 
150. Nebraska, North carolina and Rhode Island. 
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Duration of registration periods of employees and registration fees for 
employees are seldom stated in the codes. 
Revocation of a license is of equal importance, and thirty-five 
states prescribe conditions under which a license may be revoked.151 
Grounds for revocation most often cited are: (1) misrepresentation 
on the license application; (2) "just cause"; and (3) conviction of a 
felony. In nine states revocation provisions apply equally to employee 
registrants and licensees.152 However, in the remaining states, the 
statutory provisions are generally unclear as to whether requirements 
are applicable to the licenSed agency or the registered employee or 
both. Judicial interpretation is lacking in this area, and presumably 
revocation statutes would apply only to licensees unless clearly stated 
otherwise. Nevertheless, revocation standards do establish clear ways 
and means to promote and develop expertise in the field. Eight states 
provide a mechanism, usually an administrative hearing, to formalize 
the revocation and provide a right to appeal in a state court of law.153 
The extent to which revocation is used and of its practicality as a 
viable regulatory tool cannot be determined from the statutes; but the 
provision decidedly exists, no doubt with the expectation that its threat 
may be as effective as its use. 
Statutory provisions in thirty-four states establish penalties for 
violation of the statutes.154 The penalty usually stipulates a fine 
and/or imprisonment. Fines range from not less than $500 to not 
more than $5,000, and imprisonment from six months to a maximum 
of one year. Unless the statute is silent, violation is usually classified as 
a misdemeanor. Penalties are generally imposed for violating the code 
provisions, but are also imposed for falsifying application material, 
impersonating a law enforcement officer, disobeying court orders, 
carrying dangerous weapons illegally, misleading the public, using 
illegal means to collect debts, manufacturing evidence, failing to main-
tain bond coverage, and using unnecessary force or violence. 
151. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District 
of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, lllinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin. 
152. Indiana, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Caro-
lina, Texas and Wisconsin. 
153. Georgia, Indiana, New York, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin and 
the District of Columbia. 
154. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District 
of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont and Wisconsin. 
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The posting of a bond or the purchase of a minimum amount of 
insurance is the fourth most regulated area, provided for by thirty-
three states.155 Insurance and bond amounts vary from $1,000 to $2,-
000 in the majority of states. However, the statutes dealing with this 
requirement seldom specify whether the bond or insurance amount 
need be maintained per year or per incident. Fourteen states require 
that a minimum bond or insurance coverage of $10,000 or more be 
posted with the appropriate state authority.156 In light of the extensive 
injury that can be anticipated from the nature of private investigative 
work, these minimal bonding provisions are clearly intended as part 
of the cost of doing business rather than as a protective measure for 
the public that may be seriously harmed. States that have utilized the 
bond statutes to effectuate an adequate and responsible protection 
mechanism for the public are discussed in the last section of this 
article. 157 
The fifth most regulated area is the requirement of a criminal 
record check of the licensee. Where the licensee is an investigation 
agency, the criminal record check is required of the officers of the 
company only. No individual convicted of a felony is eligible for a 
license under the statutes. Although the licensee in thirty-one states 
must meet this requirement,158 twelve states additionally require that 
employees of the licensee have no record of a felony conviction.159 In 
fifteen states where employees are registered or licensed, a separate 
criminal record check must be made prior to receiving registration of 
licensing.16o Recognizing that, as of 1969, an estimated 32,000 pri-
vate detectives were licensed and that the licensing requirements are 
enforced by diverse state agencies whose sole function is seldom regu-
155. Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Co-
lumbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, lllinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont and Wisconsin. 
156. Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Maine (non-resi-
den~ only), Michigan (corporations only), Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont and Wisconsin (agencies only). 
157. See text accompanying notes 247-52 infra. In addition, New Mexico re-
quires all claims against bonds or insurers to be reported. 
158. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Hawaii, lllinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont 
and West Virginia. 
159. Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, lllinois, Maine, Nebraska, New Jersey New 
York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas and Wisconsin. ' 
160. Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, lllinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland Ne-bras~a, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas and Wis-
conSill. 
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lation of the private detective industry, it is unlikely that accurate and 
criminal records checks are regularly conducted.161 
Because statutory requirements for licensing such as fees, length 
of license, grounds for revocation, penalties for violation of the stat-
utes, and criminal records checks are those most often enacted, their 
frequency indicates a concern for administrative procedures. And al-
though these requirements regulate the field in a bureaucratic manner, 
actual controls through statutes are seldom achieved without addi-
tional provisions regarding the personal qualifications of the licensee. 
In this area of personal qualifications, age of the licensee is most 
notable. Twenty-seven states have minimum age limits. Eighteen is 
the minimum age in six states,162 twenty-one in eleven states,163 and 
twenty-five in nine states.164 One state requires that the applicant 
have reached the age of majority.165 Several states provide that if the 
licensee is an agency, twenty-five is the minimum age, whereas em-
ployees or registrants may be younger.166 
The requirement of prior experience in twenty-seven states 
would appear to raise the minimum age de facto.167 Generally, the 
prior experience requirement entails three years' experience as a 
peace officer on a police force. Two states require that the rank of 
detective be achieved.16s That many ex-public policemen enter this 
field either as private detectives or members of an investigative agency 
no doubt adds to the quality and expertise of the industry because of 
the rigorous training required of public peace officers. The prior ex-
perience requirement is therefore probably the most substantial control 
the states exert over the quality of their licensed private detectives and 
investigative agencies, considering that three states169 require special-
ized training and only three other states170 establish minimal educa-
tional standards as prerequisites. 
161. 1 RAND, supra note 2, at 11, Table 1. It should be emphasized that the fig-
ures used by the Rand study included data only through 1969. 
162. California, Georgia, Iowa, North Carolina, North Dakota and South Caro-
lina. 
163. Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, Ohio, Texas and Vermont. 
164. Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New 
York, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. . 
165. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-33-13 (1974). 
166. Connecticut, Hawaii, Texas and Wisconsin. 
167. Arizona, California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, 
Dlinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin. 
168. Maryland and Massachusetts. 
169. Hawaii, Ohio and South Carolina. 
170. Hawaii, Michigan and West Virginia. 
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In addition, thirty states control the quality of the licensees by 
specifying grounds for denying the application.171 Grounds for deni-
al often include a felony conviction or the lack of good moral charac-
ter. Interestingly enough, no state lists personal incompetence or lack 
of expertise in the field as a basis for denial, although eleven states 
require that a qualifying examination be taken.172 Sixteen states re-
quire references from three to five individuals who reside in the area 
where the licensee intends to work.173 Other means of control by the 
regulatory agencies exist in the form of a statutory requirement that 
applicants be state residents or United States citizens. Private detec-
tives and officers of investigative agencies must possess United States 
citizenship in twenty-six states.174 However, only eight states require 
that licensees be state residents.175 
·Finally, twenty-eight states have enacted fingerprinting require-
ments for private detectives and licensees of investigative agencies.176 
This requirement apparently is the method used to prevent persons 
with felony convictions from being licensed. However, registrants or 
employees who perform detective or investigative functions appear 
exempt from supplying fingerprints in twelve of the states which re-
quire fingerprints from licensees.177 An additional method of identi-
fication in twenty-five states is the requirement that photographs be 
submitted with the application.178 Again, however, employees and 
registrants operating under a licensee are not subject to this qualifica-
tion. The use of photographs and fingerprints also enables a state to 
171. Arizona. Arkansas, California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia. Flor-
ida. Hawaii, lllinois, Indiana. Iowa. Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota. Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, North Carolina, North Dakota. Ohio, Pennsylvania. South Carolina, Texas, 
Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin. 
172. California, Hawaii, illinois, Iowa. Nevada, North Carolina. New York, 
North Dakota. Ohio, Texas and Vermont. 
173. Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada. New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina. Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, 
Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin. 
174. Arizona. Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida. Georgia, Hawaii, illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota. OhiO, Penn-
sylvania. South Carolina, Texas and Wisconsin. 
175. Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana. Michigan, Nevada. Texas and Wis-
consin. 
176. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida. Georgia, 
Hawaii, lllinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota. Nebraska, 
Nevada. New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, 
North Dakota. Ohio, Pennsylvania. South Carolina, Texas and West Virginia. 
177. Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota. Nevada, 
New Hampshire, North Dakota. South Carolina and West Virginia. 
178. Arizona, Arkansas, California. Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, llli-
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania. South Caro-
lina, Texas and West Virginia. 
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prevent the transfer of a license obtained by a qualified person or 
-agency to one which would not meet the statutory requirements. 
The statutory controls affecting personnel quality do place re-
strictions on entry and practice in this field. Nevertheless, these re-
quirements are minimal in terms of guaranteeing the public and the 
purchaser of the services private detectives or investigative agents 
comparable in quality to those provided by the F.B.I., state police 
or local police forces. The mere absence of a felony conviction seems 
to be the most common criterion used to determine eligibilty to enter 
this field. 
The majority of public investigation officers are used to obtain 
information relating to criminal activities which could result in the 
possible loss or curtailment of an individual's civil liberties. On the 
other hand, the private detective's work is limited only to those sub-
jects which the purchaser pays to have investigated. The use of this 
information is thus not confined to the legal and judicial community, 
but can pervade every level of human activity and interaction. There-
fore, the minimal controls found in this statutory survey, even where 
most comprehensive, as in Texas or Arizona, are inadequate to main-
tain quality in this field on a par with that prev~g in the public 
realm. 
A major area of potential regulation governs the interaction be-
tween the licensee and the public. Whether or not statutory require-
ments for weapons licenses,. identification cards, uniforms and 
badges constitute effective controls over the public police, they do 
alert the public to their existence against which protective measures 
may be privately taken. However, although the phrase "private dec-
tive" implies that investigative services are being supplied for private 
purposes, four states have granted statutory powers exceeding those 
of private citizens to the licensees.179 The measure of this extraordi-
nary citizen power ranges from full police authority to simply the 
power to stop and arrest. Only three states have enacted statutes 
designed to emphasize that private detectives and detective agencies 
possess on greater police powers than the private citizen.180 
The lack of appropriate and adequate controls becomes more 
significant in view of the fact that only fifteen states require that an 
179. Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii and South Carolina. 
180. Arkansas, Indiana and Kansas. 
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additional license be obtained for the use of a weapon.181 Three have 
restrictions on the use of weapons,182 and three others require a profi-
ciency test prior to licensing.183 Although the nature of investigative 
work may sometimes create a need for weapons, their use is not always 
essential. This lack of control and concern by the regulatory agencies 
indicates the potential danger presented by unskilled, armed private 
detectives in our midst. 
Twenty-two states requITe that the private detective carry an 
identification card which is issued with the license;184 thirteen states 
provide for the issuing of a badge;185 and nine permit uniforms to be 
worn.186 Since the nature of investigative work frequently entails an 
element of secrecy, it seems inevitable that only the carrying of identi-
fication cards or badges would be utilized by the licensee, and these 
need not be worn in clear view. Thus, the degree of protection provid-
ed the public by these statutory provisions is easily defeated by their 
unsuitability and inappropriateness to the function being regulated. 
Finally, regulating the quality of the services offered in the field 
of private investigation must reflect the training offered its personnel. 
And significantly, it must be noted that only three states have enacted 
any statutes in this area.187 The training that is provided exists be-
cause of the needs perceived by the individual licensees. Consequently, 
the scope and substance of these training programs vary from the sim-
plistic to the comprehensive, depending upon the profit to be realized 
from a minimum level of performance. However, no statutes require 
training to be on a par with training required of public officials en-
gaged in parallel activities. Thus, the most influential means of 
regulating by the states has never been fully instituted. Licensees are 
approved on a perfunctory application of -bureaucratic procedures 
rather than on a critical evaluation of qualifications necessary to the 
field. 
181. California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florid3., Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, South 
Carolina and Wisconsin. 
182. Georgia, New Mexico and South Carolina. 
183. Georgia, Maryland and South Carolina. 
184. Arizona, AFkausas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Texas. 
185. Arkansas, Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. New York spe~ 
cifically forbids badges to be issued or used. 
186. Arizona, Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, 
New Mexico, New York and Ohio. 
187. Georgia, Ohio and South Carolina. 
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Insurance Adjusters 
Insurance adjusters are regulated by twenty-eight states,188 and 
in twenty-five states the regulation is by an agency at the state level.l89 
In twenty-three states the agency responsible is the insurance com-
mission or commissioner.loo 
The need for the regulation of insurance adjusters derives from 
the services that they perform. In general, insurance adjusters are em-
ployed by either insurance companies or by private individuals to in-
vestigate clalms made against a policy. Since the essence of the work 
entails investigation, which are the same skills and techniques as-
sociated with detectives and investigators, insurance adjusters are 
within the scope of this article. 
In contrast to the licensing of the private detective and investiga-
tive agency field, nineteen states grant licenses to insurance adjusters 
only after the applicant has passed a written examination.lOl Since 
study materials for the examination topics are provided with the ex-
amination fee, this requirement establishes some minimum and uni-
form qualification for all adjusters within a state. Although this regu-
latory requirement does not presume to require specific educational 
training or experience, four states require specific educational back-
grounds and training.102 Seventeen states require prior experience as 
a qualification for the license, which indicates a partial degree of con-
trol over the quality and ability of the licensees through the licensing 
requirements.193 
The states further control the quality of the licensees by estab-
lishing grounds for denial and revocation. In twenty states, misrepre-
sentation, "just cause," and dishonesty are among the most frequently 
188. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Caro-
lina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming. 
189. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Vir-
ginia, Washington and Wyoming. 
190. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington and 
Wyoming. 
191. Alaska, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Is-
land, Texas, Utah, Vermont and Washington. 
192. Arizona, Arkansas, Oklahoma and Wyoming. 
193. Alabama, Alaska. Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, 
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, .utah, Vermont, Washington and 
Wyoming. 
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cited reasons for revocation.194 Grounds for denial are established in 
nineteen states and include conviction for a felony or crime involving 
moral turpitude, and failure to pass the written examination.195 Fif-
teen states have established statutory penalties for infractions of these 
and other statutory requirements.196 It is interesting to note that four-
teen states require a personal character check prior to licensing,197 
whereas only two states require a criminal record check as a means of 
controlling the quality of individuals in the field.198 
In addition, with respect to personal qualifications, eighteen 
states require that the applicant have reached a specific age: seven 
states require twenty-one years,199 eight states eighteen years,200 one 
state sets twenty as the minimum age,201 and two states establish the 
age of majority as the requisite age.202 Nine states require that the 
applicant be a resident of the licensing state,203 and one state requires 
that the applicant be a United States citizen.204 Finally, only one state 
requires that an applicant submit a photograph and fingerprints as a 
requirement for the license.205 
The period for which a license is issued varies from one to two 
years, but is statutorily specified in nineteen states.206 In these nine-
teen states, a license fee is also required, but this requirement is mini-
mal in that none of the fees exceeded $10. These two requirements 
reflect the bureaucratic nature of the licensing provisions. In twelve 
states there is a statutory requirement for bonding or liability insur-
ance up to an amount of $5,000207 whereas three states require $10,-
194. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont and Washington. 
195. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho, Mississippi, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Is-
land, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont and Washington. 
196. Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah and 
Washington. 
, 197 .. Arkansas, Maine, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington and Wyoming. 
198. California and New Mexico. 
199. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Nevada, Utah and Vermont. 
200. California, Maine, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Virginia 
and Washington. 
201. HAWAll REv. STAT. § 431-467. 
202. New Mexico and Wyoming. 
203. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, North Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Wash· 
ington and Wyoming. 
204. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.865(b) (1974). 
205. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE § 7525(f) (West 1974). 
206. ~na, Arkansas,. Calif0!.frla, Florida, -!lawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, 
New MeXICO, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvarua, Rhode Island, South Carolina 
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington and Wyoming. . ' 
207. California, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Washington. 
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000 as a minimum amount of insurance.208 The public is thus provid-
ed some assurance that the licensee is a reputable business person; 
whether it protects the public from incompetent insurance adjusters is 
·unknown. 
In two states an identification card is issued,209 and one state 
requires that a pocket card be carried by the licensee and displayed 
upon request. 210 In addition, one state describes the limits of the legal 
authority of an insurance adjuster.211 Only one state exempts both 
licensees and employees from obtaining a license to own or carry 
weapons and requires no training in their use.212 Again, the rest of 
the states are silent. 
In conclusion, the most effective controls exerted by the states 
exist at the state level through the insurance commission or commis-
sioner. The most effective means of attempting genuine control 
would seem to be through the requirement that an applicant for a 
license 'pass a written examination. Since the quality of the examina-
tions themselves could not be evaluated from the statutory survey, the 
effectiveness of this requirement cannot be precisely ascertained. 
Moreover, the connection between a certain level of achievement on a 
written examination and the quality of the work to be performed by an 
insurance adjuster is not conclusive as to the examination's effective-
ness as a method of regulation. Nevertheless, the written examination 
provides an objective means of evaluating the qualifications of individ-
uals employed to investigate insurance claims. 
Polygraph Examiners 
It is becoming increasingly important to recognize that poly-
graph examiners perform police-like functions and are vested with 
police-like powers. This law-enforcement classification derives from 
the fact that a polygraph examination generally consists of an investi-
gation which might be regarded both as an invasion of one's right to 
privacy and an abrogation of one's right against self-incrimination. 
Nevertheless, lie detector tests, commonly administered by pri-
vate polygraph examiners, are thought to be of great practical utility 
in the areas of internal and criminal investigations and personnel se-
208. Maine, Oklahoma (public adjusters only) and Vermont. 
209. California and Washington. 
210. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE § 7533 (West 1974). 
211. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7538 (West 1974). 
212. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12031(b), 12031.5 (West Supp. 1975). 
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lection and screening.213 Despite their utility in these areas, the nega~ 
tive consequences of these tests have been such that seventeen states 
have adopted statutes forbidding an individual or business to require 
submission to a polygraph examination as a condition of employ~ 
ment.214 
The belief that a polygraph examination might constitute an un~ 
warranted invasion of an individual's privacy was the basis of section 
432.2 of the California Labor Code. That section forbids an empl<;>yer 
to demand or require any applicant for employment or any present 
employee to submit to a polygraph examination. However, it has been 
held that an employer may "request" or "permit" an employee to sub~ 
mit to a lie detector test. While the lie detector test may not, in Califor-
nia, be used as a condition of employment, it is frequently used as a 
means of facilitating examinations that might have been conducted in 
another manner.215 The majority of states do not forbid the admin-
istration of polygraph examinations as a condition of employment, al~ 
though organized labor has openly opposed this practice as a violation 
of individual rights. 
While the results of lie detector tests are generally inadmissible 
as evidence at trial (unless the parties stipulate otherwise)216 lie de-
tector examinations are used extensively as a part of pre-trial investi-
gatory procedure. The proponents of polygraph examinations urge 
that innocent persons may be eliminated as suspects and thus be 
spared any further fear, embarrassment or inconvenience. At the 
same time, polygraph examination expedites the search for the guilty 
person. Advocates of the use of the polygraph maintain that "[t]he 
use and availability of lie detector examinations will reduce the extent 
of third degree practices, especially among innocent suspects."217 
Insofar as lie detectors playa significant role in criminal investi-
gation and polygraph examination techniques are rapidly becoming 
more sophisticated, it is essential that this profession be controlled 
and regulated on a statewide basis, especially since it is generally 
agreed that extensive supervised training is indispensable for proper 
administration and accurate interpretation of the lie detector test. 218 
213. F. INBAU & J. REID, LIE DETECTION AND CruMlNAL INTERROGATION 110 (3d 
ed.1953). 
214. Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, Virginia and Washington. 
215. 43 ATIY. GEN. OP. 25 (1964). 
216. United States v. De Betham, 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal. 1972). 
217. F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 213, at 110. 
218. [d. at 115. 
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Nevertheless, only sixteen states have adopted legislation re-
quiring the licensing and regulation of polygraph examiners.219 It is 
astonishing that a profession which requires a high degree of skill and 
which has such potentially far-reaching consequences is virtually un-
regulated in over two-thirds of the states. In thirty-four states, a person 
with no training, experience, or other qualifications can lawfully ad-
minister polygraph examinations which have a significant impact on 
criminal proceedings. This is especially noteworthy in light of the fact 
that experts in the area of polygraph examination maintain that the 
qualifications and training of an examiner are the critical factors in 
assessing the accuracy and reliability of lie detector tests.220 
The sixteen states that do regulate polygraph examiners have 
quite similar licensing procedures and qualification requirements. In 
seven of those states, the industry is controlled by a polygraph ex-
aminer's board.221 In the other nine states, the profession is regulated 
by a larger agency, such as the secretary of state, the attorney general 
or the department of public safety. Although all of the statutes are 
similar in other respects; the agency can have a profound affect on the 
enforcement of the regulation. A smaller, more specialized agency 
is a more effective means of enforcing regulations than a larger agency 
which oversees the licensing of many professions and which of neces-
sity can do little more than collect license fees. Although no com-
parative data are currently available on enforcement in different 
states, it appears desirable that licensing be controlled by a specialized 
board of polygraph examiners who are familiar with and qualified in 
the administration of lie detector tests. 
All states which license polygraph examiners require the licen-
see to be a resident of the United States. All have a minimum age 
limit, ranging from eighteen to twenty-five years. It seems doubtful 
that an eighteen-year-old would be qualified to administer an examina-
tion which requires a rudimentary knowledge, of psychology and 
physiology, and preferably a college education and some investigative 
experience. 
Five states require that an applicant submit a photograph prior 
to the issuance of a license,222 and eight states require that the appli-
219. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Missis-
sippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Texas, Utah and Virginia. 
220. F. lNBAU & J. REID, supra note 213, at 114. 
221. Alabama, Georgia, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oklahoma and 
Texas. 
222. FlOrida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina and Utah. 
"471 
39
Dralla: Private Police
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1975
GOLDEN GATE LAW REVIEW 
cant be fingerprinted223 to insure that the license is not transferred to 
an unqualified examiner. Six states have absolutely no provisions for 
the identification of licensees.224 The period for which a license is 
issued is one year in all states. License fees range from $10 for an 
intern licensee to $250 for a private polygraph examiner, depending 
on the state in which the license is issued. 
Although the requirements differ slightly from state to state, all 
sixteen states which license polygraph examiners have some mini-
mum requirement as to training, education or prior investigative ex-
perience. Eleven of the states require that the polygraph examiner 
have a B.A. degree or five years of prior investigatory experience.225 
In those states which require only a high school diploma, some train-
ing at a polygraph examiner's school or participation in an internship 
program is necessary. The duration of these programs ranges from six 
weeks to six months. Twelve of the sixteen states require that the ap-
plicant pass a written examination.226 
In every state that licenses polygraph examiners, there are spe-
cific grounds for denial, suspension and revocation of licenses. The 
grounds given in Alabama Revised Statutes Section 297(22fff) are 
typical: 
The board may refuse to issue or may suspend or revoke a 
license on anyone or more of the following grounds: 
(1) For failing to inform a subject to be exam-
ined that his participation in the examina-
tion is voluntary; or 
(2) For failing to inform a subject to be exam-
ined as to the nature of the examination; or 
(3) Failing to inform the subject of the results 
of the examination requested; or 
( 4) Willful disregard or violation of this chapter 
or of any regulation or rule issued pursuant 
thereto, including, but not limited to, will-
fully making a false report concerning an 
examination for polygraph examination pur-
poses; or 
223. Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Virginia 
and Utah. 
224. Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, New Mexico, Oklahoma and South Carolina. 
225. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, lllinois, Michigan, Mississippi, Okla-
homa, South Carolina, Texas and Utah. 
226. Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Texas. 
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(5) Willfully aiding or abetting another in the 
violation of this chapter or any regulation or 
rule issued pursuant thereto; or 
(6) Having demonstrated unworthiness or in-
competency to act as a polygraph examiner 
as defined by this chapter; or 
(7) Making any willful misrepresentation or 
false promises or causing to be permitted 
any false or misleading advertisement for 
the purpose of directly obtaining business or 
trainees; or 
(8) Allowing one's license under this chapter to 
be used by any unlicensed person in viola-
tion of the provisions of this chapter; or 
(9) If the holder of any license has been ad-
judged guilty of the commission of a felony 
or a misdemeanor involving moral turpi-
tude; or 
(10) Where the license holder has been adjudged 
an habitual drunkard or mentally incompe-
tent as provided in the probate code; or 
(11) Material misstatement in the application for 
the original license or in the application of 
any renewal license under this chapter; or 
(12) Failing, within a reasonable time, to provide 
information requested by the secretary as 
the result of a formal complaint to the board 
which indicates a violation of this chapter. 
In all sixteen states, there is a penalty for failure to comply with 
the provisions of the act. The penalties vary from a misdemeanor to a 
$1,000 fine and/or twelve months maximum imprisonment. 
Statutory regulation of polygraph examiners is markedly differ-
ent from regulation of other private police professions. While most 
professions are regulated, albeit inefficiently in most states,· poly-
graph examiners are regulated in only one-third of the states.227 Al-
though sparse, the regulation is consistent and comparatively thor-
ough in all of the sixteen states. Most of the regulations are relatively 
recent, and several of the states that regulate polygraph examiners by 
statute have done so within the past four years. 
227. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, lllinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Mis-
sissippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Da,kota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Texas, Utah and Virginia. . 
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Railroad Police 
Forty-one states in the United States have enacted statutes which 
authorize railroad companies to hire private citizens or to designate 
their own employees as private railroad police.228 In these states, rail-
road conductors, brakemen and ticket agents, who have no police 
training, are vested with police powers. 
Although private police and railway police share many common 
powers above those of the ordinary citizen, private railroad police 
were historically intended to serve a different purpose than most other 
private police. While most of the areas of private police protection are 
relatively ~ew, and while the statutes that describe the limits of their 
powers have been enacted within the past twenty years, the statutes 
that provide for private police protection of railroads are much older. 
Many of these statutes were enacted in the late nineteenth century and 
vest steamship and express companies with the same powers as rail-
roads to appoint private police. The original purpose of the statuteS 
which authorized police for transportation companies was twofold. 
First, railway police were supposed to protect cargo being shipped 
over long distances. Second, railway police were a helpful solution 
to the jurisdictional problems that arose when crimes were committed 
on railroads operating in several states. 
Although times have changed, the broad powers of railroad po-
lice and conductors have not. In all forty-one states authorizing rail-
way police, the power of these private employees greatly exceeds that 
of ordinary citizens. In none of the forty-one states is there a regu-
latory agency which deals exclusively with railroad police. In fact, 
railroads have received a virtually unrestricted grant of police power. 
The typical statute authorizes a railroad company to apply to the 
governor of the state to have any number of its employees appointed 
as railroad police. The police are paid by the railroad company, and 
the company is liable for the acts of the employee. The railroad 
policeman on railroad property typically possesses all the arrest and 
detention powers of a public policeman. 
In only two of the forty-one states is there a state residency re-
quirement for railroad police.229 Three require that a railroad police-
man be a citizen of the United States.230 The only state which has an 
228. All states except Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Mis· 
souri, Nebraska and New York. 
229. Michigan and Montana. 
230. Massachusetts, Montana and Wisconsin. 
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age requirement for railroad police is Michigan, where the minimum 
age is eighteen years.231 Since the training required to be a railroad 
conductor is drastically different from that which would be necessary 
for one who performs police functions, it is possible for an unquali-
fied eighteen-year-old citizen of any state to be designated a railroad 
policeman. There are no requirements that photographs or finger-
prints be submitted at the time of registration. Considering the broad 
powers that these officers have and the potential abuse of power that 
could be avoided, requiring them to submit photographs and finger-
prints at the time of registration would appear reasonable. 
Other than Arizona, which requires railroad police to meet the 
same minimum qualifications as public police,232 no state requires 
any prior experience or minimum educational level. Only two states, 
Ohio and Indiana, require training for railroad policemen. Ohio re-
quires twenty years of investigatory experience or participation in a 
special training program.233 
Michigan and New Jersey are the only states that require a rail-
road policeman to undergo a criminal records check before being al-
lowed to act as a policeman.234 Presumably, an ex-felon might be des-
ignated as a railroad policeman with peace officer's powers in any of 
the other thirty-eight states which authorize railway police but do not 
require crime checks. 
In none of the forty-one states are there criteria for the denial Qf 
status as a railroad policeman. Presumably, the railroad has total dis-
cretion. Indiana and West Virginia are the only states which provide 
for the revocation of one's designation as a railroad policeman. The 
grounds for revocation include misconduct, incompetence, drunken-
ness, neglect of duty, or gross immorality.235 Assuming that railroad 
police will continue to exist, similar grounds for revocation must be 
established in all states, especially those which authorize a virtually 
unrestricted grant of police power. 
Ohio alone requires payment of a fine for train conductors who 
have abused their police power. The amount of the fine ranges from 
$5 to $25.236 Considering the abuses that are possible when a private 
citizen is authorized to carry a gun and to make arrests, as railroad 
231. MICH. COMPo LAws § 470.51 (1967). 
232. ARIz. STAT. § 40-856 (1974). 
233. Omo REv. CoDB ANN. § 109.78 (1973). 
234. Michigan and New Jersey. 
235. Indiana and West Virginia. 
236. Omo REv. CoDB ANN. § 4973.99(B) (1973). 
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police are, this penalty schedule is hardly adequate to deter abuses 
of law. 
Kentucky, Ohio and New Jersey require a $5 license fee. In 
Michigan the fee is $2. These are the only states that issue licenses. 
Since the cost of licenses is supposed to cover the cost incurred in the 
enforcement of regulations, such an insignificant fee can hardly be 
classified as regulatory. 
Nine states require that a bond be posted to cover any civi1liabil· 
ity that might be incurred by the employee while acting within the 
scope of employment.237 This could be an important regulatory fea· 
ture, because bonding is often the only means of assuring sufficient 
assets to cover civil judgments arising from abuses of power. 
The biggest problem in the area of rIDIroad police is that a citizen 
might easily confuse them with public police. It is essential that they 
be distinguishable, since the controls and regulations that apply to 
public law enforcement officers do not apply to private railroad po· 
lice. Nineteen states require that railway police wear badges that are 
distinguishable from those of public police and that identify them as 
railroad police.238 While such means of distinction seem crucial, the 
other twenty states provide no means by which an ordinary citizen 
might ayoid confusing railway police with public police. In fact, rail· 
way police derive a good deal of their authority from the fact that they 
are often mistaken for public police. While railroad police have been 
given broad powers in their respective jurisdictions, their jurisdiction 
is generally limited to property owned by the railroad company which 
employs them. One means of limiting their exercise of power to the 
legal jurisdiction is to take all practical measures to insure that they 
are not confused with public police. 
Railroad police are presumably allowed to use weapons in the 
states which grant them the power of peace officers in their respective 
jurisdictions. Four states-Arizona, Arkansas, Ohio and West Virgin· 
ia--expressly authorize railroad companies to require that an addi· 
tional bond be posted if a railroad policeman carries a gun; however, 
there are no requirements regarding the use of weapons or training 
in the use of firearms. 
237. Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, 
Oklahoma and Tennessee. ' 
238. Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ne-
vada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin. 
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Fair Police 
Eighteen jurisdictions have adopted statutes that provide au-
thority for private citizens to serve as police at fairs, meetings and 
exhibitions.239 The majority of these statutes deal with police who 
patrol state fairs, which are often sponsored by private corporations. 
Generally, these private police have full police powers while on duty 
at the event during which they were hired to serve. 
In several of the eighteen jurisdictions, the power to appoint, 
regulate and control these private police rests in the private corpora-
tion or society which sponsors the event. 240 In others, the private po-
lice who guard state fairs are appointed by the state department of 
agriculture.241 In four states an agency of the government, such as the 
sheriff (South Carolina) or a justice of the peace (Ohio), has the 
power to deputize-private persons to serve as police for the duration of 
the event for which they have been appointed to patrol. 242 
Probably because these police are appointed to serve for short 
periods of time, controls such as residence requirements, examina-
tions, photographs, fingerprints, cause for denial and grounds for rev-
ocation are nonexistent. Ohio is the only state that requires special 
training or past experience.243 New Jersey alone requires a character 
check.244 In no state is it necessary to flIP. a check to determine wheth-
er the guard has any prior criminal convictions. No state provides a 
penalty for abuse of power or gross negligence, other than common 
law civil actions. Ohio and South Carolina are the only states that 
require the individual to post a bond to assure payment of any civil 
judgment that is rendered against him while acting within the scope of 
employment.245 Michigan and Minnesota are the only states that re-
quire state fair police to wear badges that identify them as such.246 In 
the other sixteen jurisdictions, the majority of citizens with whom they 
come into contact are probably under the popular misapprehension 
that the private citizens who patrol state fairs are public police. While 
no data are available as to the frequency with which weapons are car-
239. Connecticut. the District of Columbia, lllinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Car-
olina, South Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming. 
240. E.g., MICH. CoMP. 1..A.ws § 453.361 (1967). 
241. For example, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 35.14 (1963). 
242. For example, S.C. STAT. §§ 53-121 to 53-124 (1962). 
243. Omo REV. CoDE ANN. § 109.78. 
244. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:15-4 (1973). 
245. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.01 (1954); S.C. STAT. § 53-121 to 53-125 
(1962). 
246. MICH. CoMP. LA.ws § 453.371 (1967); MINN. SrAT. ANN. § 38.01 (1963). 
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ried, the main problem in this area is the danger of potential abuse of 
power resulting from confusion of fair police with public police. 
IV. THE USEFULNESS OF BONDING AS A :MEANS OF 
REGULATING THE PRIVATE POLICE INDUSTRY 
The preceding studies indicate two important conclusions re-
garding the developments that have occurred in the regulation of the 
private police industry from the time of the Rand study in 1970 to the 
present study in 1975. First, although the Rand study urged that stat-
utes be enacted to regulate private police, there are still relatively few 
comprehensive statutes which regulate the industry. There are even 
fewer governmental agencies which devote substantial effort toward 
the realization of such regulations. Second, the majority of states that 
do regulate private police have chosen to do so through bonding or 
liability insurance requirements, rather than through the establish-
ment of uniform regulatory agencies and controls suggested by the 
Rand study. Generally, the statutes only require that the licensee post 
a bond or obtain insurance to cover any civil liability incurred in the 
scope of employment. Employees of the licensees are largely ignored 
by the statutes. 
The tendency of the states to rely on bonding rather than to es-
tablish administrative agencies as the principal means of control indi-
cated that further study of the effects of bonding was necessary. One 
purpose of this study is to test the effectiveness of protective devices 
available directly to the public, for if such devices exist, public in-
terest may not be severely affected by delays in the development of 
comprehensive statutory regulations and/or supervisory agencies. 
Previously, no data were available as to the extent to which the 
public had resorted to the bonds to redress the alleged wrongs of pri-
vate police. A survey was therefore undertaken of those state agencies 
with which bonds have been posted. The purpose of the survey was to 
ascertain the frequency of claims and related data. 
478 
Two assumptions were made concerning the bonds: 
1. That the bonding requirement was prem-
ised on the belief that there was a need to 
assure the existence of a fund against which 
aggrieved members of the public could pro-
ceed. 
2. That considering the large number of pri-
vate police and the nature of their contacts 
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with the public, private police activity would 
have given rise to a sufficient number of 
claims to be a partial but useful indicator of 
the utility of this regulatory mechanism. 
The results of the survey follow. Questionnaires were sent to the 
secretaries of state of all fifty states; thirty-three replied. The replies 
received indicate that seven states have no bonding requirement.247 
Nine others leave the decision of bonding to local authorities.248 
Thus, in these states there are no requirements for filing notice of 
bonds posted with the secretary of state or any other state office 
which would maintain the desired statistics on bonding. 
In November, 1974 Montana enacted new legislation relating 
to private police. The first licenses with bonding requirements under 
the new statutes will be issued early in 1975. Thus, Montana could 
not provide statistics relating to bonding and its effectiveness. 
Of the other responses, eight secretaries of state indicate that an 
average of 189 licensed security guard and detective agencies per 
state have filed a bond with some state office.249 Florida has on record 
the largest number of bonds filed (746), while North Dakota has 
the smallest number (11). Only five of the above states also require 
licensed individual security guards and private detectives to post 
bonds and file a record of them with a state office.250 Again, Florida 
has on record the greatest number (138), while New Hampshire has 
the smallest, with only twenty-two on record. 
Four states issue licenses which carry bonding requirements that 
are identical for both companies and individuals.251 No statistical sep-
aration is maintained as to individuals or agencies. Further, no 
records are available as to the number or types of claims which may 
be, or which are, filed. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Kansas and Wisconsin require 
only individual licensed detectives to be bonded and of record, while 
three other states merely demand that licensed detective agencies post 
bonds and file them with an appropriate office.252 
247. Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, Oregon and Tennessee. 
248. California, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vir-
ginia and Washington. 
249. Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota and Vermont 
250. Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, New Hampshire and North Dakota. 
251. Colorado, Maine, Michigan and New York. 
252. Arizona, Kansas and West Virginia. 
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Among the thirty-three responses received, there have been only 
six reported claims filed against security guard companies and detec-
tive agencies between January 1, 1972 and January 1, 1975. One of 
these claims was filed in Arizona in 1974 against a detective agency 
for illegal detention. The other four claims were filed in Massachu-
setts, also during 1974, for ~tions not specified on the response. The 
remaining claim was in New Hampshire in 1974 against an individual 
for fraud. There was no indication whether this claim was against a 
~ecurity guard or a private detective. 
Although bonding and liability insurance requirements theoret-
ically might provide an effective means of regulation of private police, 
it is apparent from the sparse data that they do not at the present time. 
The partial response that has been received indicates that bonding 
provides neither an adequate avenue for redress of alleged wrongs 
committed by private police officers nor any realistic means of regula-
tion. 
V. SURVEY OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
The foregoing data indicate that the mechanisms for control of 
private police are inefficient and sparse. A fundamental thesis of this 
article is that the private police industry in America has been typified 
by the absence of controls, In an attempt to determine' whether this 
situation is likely to change in the future, the authors have surveyed 
the attorneys general of ·all fifty states as to the current status of the 
private 'police industry in their respective states. In addition, the at-
torneys general were questioned ,as to prospective legislation affecting 
private police. To date, responses have been obtained from the attor-
neys general in twenty-nine states. 
In thirteen of the twenty-nine states the existing regulations of 
the private police industry are currently under review by an agency in 
the executive or legislative branch of state government.253 The fact 
that the industry is being reviewed in almost one-half of the states 
responding to the survey indicates that there exists a moderate amount 
of concern about the lack of control over the largest and most rapidly 
increasing police force in our country today. 
253. The states and the agencies are as follows: Colorado (Attorney General), 
Connecticut (State Police Dep't), Hawaii (Dep't of Regulatory Agencies), Indiana 
(State Police, Kentucky (Dep't of Justice), Massachusetts (Dep't of Public Safety), 
Nebraska (Commission of Criminal Justice), Nevada (Attorney General), New Jer-
sey (State Legislature), Texas (Board of Investigators), Vermont (Board of Private 
Detective Licenses), Virginia (State ·Crime Commission), and Wisconsin (Dep't of 
Licenses). . 
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Of the twenty-nine states, only four have adopted legislative 
controls within the past year.254 Seven states have, within the past 
year, enacted administrative regulations which affect the private po-
lice industry.255 While most of these changes are merely means of 
facilitating the administration of existing legal requirements, such as 
identification and registration procedures, within the past year both 
:Connecticut and Pennsylvania have adopted provisions restricting 
the use of weapons by private police. This is an area which is virtually 
unregulated in many states, and one in which revision of existing laws 
is highly desirable. At present only Colorado, Kansas, Nevada and 
North Dakota are considering actual proposed legislation for the reg-
ulation of any aspect of the private police industry. 
The attorneys general were also questioned about the current 
effectiveness of regulation of the private police industry in their states. 
Thirteen indicated that the existing pattern of regulation adequately 
protects the interests of the public.256 Lack of regulation, difficulty of 
enforcement, lack of adequate supervision and inadequacy of admin-
istrative procedures were the reasons most frequently cited by those 
who consider present statutory controls inadequate. 
Upon further questioning, however, twenty-one out of twenty-
nine responses indicated specific inadequacies do in fact exist with 
regard to several critical aspects of private police regulation.257 Eleven 
responses indicated that the caliber of person recruited for employ-
ment by the private police industry might not be in the best interest of 
public protection.258 Presumably this situation arises from the fact 
that the private police officer is often underpaid, poorly educated and 
seldom trained.259 Thirteen responses indicated concern over the right 
of private police to carry weapons.260 Not surprisingly, the bulk of the 
criticism stems from the fact that the ordinary citizen is likely to con-
fuse private police with public police. Seventeen attorneys general re-
plied that their state permits private police to wear uniforms that are 
254. Arkansas, Minnesota, North Carolina and Pennsylvania. 
255. Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Nevada, North Carolina, Vermont and 
Wisconsin. 
256. Arkansas, Hawaii, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont and Virginia. 
257. Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin. 
258. Alabama, Delaware, Indiana. Massachusetts, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Tennessee, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin. 
259. 1 RAND, supra note 2, at 29-35. 
260. Alabama, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Tennessee and Wisconsin. 
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often indistinguishable from those of public police.261 Thirteen attor-
neys general recognized problems in the area of providing adequate 
procedure for investigation of public complaints about private po-
lice.262 Absence of judicial or administrative procedures for the re-
dress of abuses of private police power was also a major concern of 
many of the responses. 
The final aspect of private police regulation about which the 
attorneys general were questioned was the existence and desirability of 
a single state official or agency to oversee the entire private police 
industry in each state. Of the twenty-four attorneys general that re-
sponded to this particular query, all except the Pennsylvania attorney 
general agreed that a single statewide regulatory agency for the entire 
private police industry would have a "positive effect." Ten replied 
that such an agency would be desirable263 and five states considered it 
"urgently needed."264 Although a single regulatory agency or official 
to supervise the private police industry in an entire state is essential for 
the effective regulation of private police, only sixteen of the attorneys 
general have replied that such an agency or official is currently serving 
this function. 265 
Thus, while there is substantial concern about the lack of regula-
tion of private police, little is currently being done about it. The lack of 
prospective regulation is even more significant since the private police 
industry is growing rapidly while controls remain virtually static. 
It can only be expected that with the growth of this industry, there 
may be an increase in the abuse of the inherent power possessed by 
all policemen, be they public or private. 
CONCLUSION 
Modern industrial society has recognized the need for a public 
police force since the early nineteenth century. The existence of law 
enforcement power in the hands of police has been accepted in Eng-
land, and then in the United States, only because that power has been 
261. Alabama, Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, N~ 
braska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Ver~ 
mont, Washington and Wisconsin. 
262. Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, N~ 
braska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Washington and Wisconsin. 
263. Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, New JerSey, North Carolina, 
Texas, Vermont and Washington. 
264. Alabama, Connecticut, Indiana, Virginia and Wisconsin. 
265. Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Min~ 
nesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Texas, Ver~ 
mont and Wisconsin. 
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so regulated and circumscribed that the fear of its abuse has been 
somewhat assuaged. On the other hand, the need for private police is 
an issue still open for debate and discussion. The questions of the roles 
and functions of private police are significant because private police 
have operated without the regulation and controls that were deemed 
essential to the acceptance and growth of the public police. 
Regulation of private police is still characterized by lack of effec-
tive and comprehensive treatment at the state level. Although a ma-
jority of the states attempt regulation through legislative enactments, 
these statutes have produced only a minimal degree of supervision. 
Indeed, the potentially most effective form of regulation -authorized 
and required by the statutes, surety bonds, is seldom used. Thus, the 
bonding procedure, like other existing statutory requirements, is a 
totally inefficient instrument of control. 
Although most inadequacies of current attempts at regulation 
were noted in the 1970 Rand study,266 no substantial or widespread 
improvement has occurred since its publication. The reasons for this 
may be attributed to several factors. Among them are lack of aware-
ness of the historical development, failure to recognize the considera-
ble overlap between the activities of public and private police, absence 
of data about the conduct of private police and lack of awareness that 
the private police industry is largely unregulated. The failure of gov-
ernment to impose regulation on the private police industry has creat-
ed the undesirable dichotomy of two police forces existing side-by-
side; the public one regulated, and the private one unregulated. 
266. 1 RAND, supra note 2, at 46-61. 
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